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Abstract 
The traditional approach for assessing farm sustainability (based on indicators of “productivity”, 
“profitability”, and “financial dependency”) fails to explain why there exist highly sustainable farms with 
different levels of “efficiency” such as low productive subsistent and part-time farming, non-for profit and 
cooperative enterprises, small commercial farms and large agro-corporations, etc. In this paper we adapt 
the New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics perspective to agrarian sphere, and suggest a new 
framework for assessing sustainability of farms and farm structures.  
Firstly, an analysis is made on various approaches for defining sustainability of agricultural 
systems: as “an ideology”, as “a set of strategies”, as “the ability to fulfill a set of goals”, and as “ability to 
continue”. The “problem of sustainability” in the economic model (mainly associated with “negative 
externalities”, “tragedy of commons”, “jointness of farm production”) is also presented, and the 
“institutional” solutions of that problem discussed. 
Second, we prove that analysis of institutions and transacting costs is important for proper 
understanding the farms sustainability. Institutional environment is the crucial factor, which determines the 
restrictions and costs of farm activities, and eventually - the level of sustainability of different farm 
organizations. In the specific institutional setting, agrarian agents use (or develop) a great variety of 
effective (cost economizing) market and non-market modes for governing of their exchanges. Therefore, 
studying the farm as a governance (rather than production) structure is the key for understanding the farm 
efficiency and sustainability.  
Third, we define sustainability of farm as a state when it manages all transactions in the most 
economical way  – that is the situation when there exist no transaction, which could be carried out with net 
benefit. When a farm experiences high costs and difficulties meeting institutional restrictions and carrying 
out transactions, comparing to other feasible modes, it will be unsustainable. That is because there will be 
strong incentives for exploring the existing potential (adapting to sustainable state) through reduction or 
enlargement of farm size, or via reorganization or liquidation of the farm. Thus the farm potential for 
adaptation to changing (market, institutional, technological etc.) environment is to be the main indicator for 
farm sustainability. Furthermore, the most effective form for organization of farm transactions will depend 
on individuals’ characteristics (preferences, entrepreneurial abilities, risk aversion etc.) and specific 
attributes of each transaction (uncertainty, frequency, assets specificity, and appropriability). Consequently, 
effective farms of different type and size could persist (sustain) in agriculture.  
Finally, we develop a principle matrix with the effective modes for governing of agrarian 
sustainability. Discrete structural analysis is used to define the transactions for which market, contract, and 
integral forms are efficient (sustainable). We also determine the situation(s), where there is strong need for 
a third-party public involvement in agrarian sphere - that is for transactions with low appropriablity, and 
high uncertainty and asset specificity. In later case, there are no sustainable market and private modes to 
organize such transactions effectively (e.g. supply of environmental goods). Next, we specify the spectrum 
of possible public forms for intervention in market and private transactions - assistance, regulation, hybrid 
and in-house organization, international cooperation, property rights and institutional modernization. The 
comparative efficiency of feasible modes for public involvement is to be assessed taking into account the 
overall costs and benefits. Sustainable agrarian development is compromised when both market and private 
forms fails, and no effective public intervention takes place.  
Key words: assessing farm sustainability, governing of agrarian and farm sustainability, 
new institutional and transaction costs economics 
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Introduction 
Assessment of farm sustainability is among the most topical issues of academic, 
business, and policies debates in developed, developing, and transitional countries. In recent 
years, it has become a part of a broader problem - evaluation of different aspects (economic, 
social, and environmental) of sustainability of agricultural systems and agrarian development 
in general  (Peteers et al., 2004). Despite the enormous progress in that respect, the process of 
development of an efficient system for assessing sustainability of farms and agrarian 
structures is far from complete.  
In dominating approach, assessment of farm efficiency and sustainability is facile 
since based on indicators for “productivity”, “profitability”, and “financial dependency”. If 
income (profit) per employed resources/production costs in a particular farm is lower than 
(sub-sectoral, regional, agricultural, country’s “comparable”) average, then it is considered as 
unsustainable.   Correspondingly, farm reliance on outside funding (e.g. dept financing, co-
investment, public subsidies) is supposed to indicate low sustainability. 
However, traditional framework has failed to explain why for long-periods of time 
there exist farms with significant differences in “level of efficiency”. In most of the countries, 
variations of income per exploitation, per hectare, and per unit of labor for different farms 
have been considerable in post-war years. That approach has proved to be especially 
inappropriate for East-European countries where a fundamental transformation has taken 
place and a great variety of new (specific) structures evolved in the area. High sustainability 
of subsistent and part-time farming, cooperative and over-integrated forms, numerous 
informal and interlinked modes, which have been dominating since the beginning of transition 
now, cannot be properly evaluated with commonly suggested indicators. In Japan there are 
also many (“weekend”, group, and public) farms, which “high” sustainability can be hardly 
explained by productivity and profitability motifs. 
Furthermore, structure of funding of farms generally depends on factors like stage in 
the farm life-cycle, experience and innovation spirit of farmer, direct and indirect costs of 
agrarian credit, tax consideration, level of access to public support programs etc., rather to be 
connected to the farm sustainability. Moreover, high outside “funding dependency” (high 
public support, accessible agrarian credit) is often associated with the “higher” sustainability 
of farms, like it is in most of developed countries. Contrary, strong reliance on own funding in 
less developing and transitional countries is habitually result of missing public support and 
market for agrarian credit, and leads to mass failures of ten of thousands farming enterprises.   
In more sophisticated models of the Neoclassical Economics, the farm is studied as a 
“black box” and the type of farm organization is not of economic importance. In that 
“institutions neutral” and “transaction costs free” framework there is a single mechanism for 
governing of overall economic activity and sustainable development – that is the free market. 
All types of farms are considered as “equally efficient” (and thus equally sustainable) in 
optimization of resources along with changes in market prices and technological 
opportunities. Besides, market financing (credit) and own funding (equity) are presumed as 
equally efficient and evenly possible (substitute) forms. Rare cases of “market failures” 
associated with “negative externalities” are also recognized but a perfect “government 
intervention” that maximize efficiency is always in place. 
In the real agrarian economy with “positive” transaction costs, the type of institutional 
arrangements and farm organizations is a crucial factor for farm and agrarian sustainability 
(“institutions and organizations matters”). New developing Institutional and Transaction Cost 
Economics overcomes the shortcomings of the traditional approache, and helps better estimate 
factors for development and comparative efficiency of various governing modes.   3
Incorporation of that new methodology into analysis of agriculture would firstly: allow 
evaluating efficiency and prospects of development of different farms and agrarian 
organizations in the specific institutional environment. And secondly, it would let access the 
comparative efficiency of existing and other feasible (market, private, hybrid, public) 
governing forms for achieving the goals of sustainable development. The aim of this paper is 
to adapt the principles of that new powerful concept to agrarian sphere, and to suggest a 
framework for assessing sustainability of farms and farm structures. 
 
CONCEPT OF AGRICULTURAL SUSTAINABILITY 
Ideology, strategy, or system characteristic 
Sustainability movements have evolved in developed countries as a response to 
concern about impacts of agriculture on depletion of non-renewable resources, soil 
degradation, health and environmental effects of chemicals, inequity, declining rural 
communities, loss of traditional values, food quality, workers safety, decline in self-
sufficiency, decreasing number of farms, etc. (Edwards et al.). Very often “sustainable” 
agriculture is used as an umbrella term of “new” approaches to “conventional” (capital-
intensive, large-scale, monoculture, etc.) agriculture, and includes organic, biological, 
alternative, ecological, low-input, biodynamical, regenerative, etc. agriculture. More recently 
“social” issues such as modes of consumption and quality of life; decentralization; 
community and rural development; gender, intra (“North- South”) and inter-generation 
equity; preservation of agrarian culture and heritage; improvement of nature; ethical issues 
(like animal welfare, use of GM crop) etc., all they have been incorporated into sustainability 
concept.  
Rio Earth Summit (1992) addressed global problem of sustainable development and 
adopted Declaration of its “universal principles”. They comprise: rights on healthy and 
productive life in harmony with nature for every individual; protecting the rights of future 
generation; integration of environmental, social and economic dimensions at all levels; 
international cooperation and partnerships; new international trade relations; application of 
precaution approach in respect to environment; polluter liability; environmental impact 
assessment; recognition of women, youth, and indigenous role and interests; peace protection, 
etc. Emergence of that “new ideology” has been associated with considerable shift of the 
“traditional paradigm” of development.  
Apart from that general description, there have also appeared more “operational” 
definitions for sustainability. For instance, sustainability is often defined as “set of 
strategies”.  Management approaches that are commonly associated with agrarian 
sustainability are: self-sufficiency through use of on-farm or locally available “internal” 
resources and know how; reduced use or elimination of soluble or synthetic fertilizers; 
reduced use or elimination of chemical pesticides and substituting integrated pest-
management practices; increased or improved use of crop rotation for diversification, soil 
fertility and pest control; increase or improved use of manures and other organic materials as 
soil amendments; increased diversity of crop and animal species, reliance of broader set of 
local crops and local technologies; maintenance of crop or residue cover on the soil; reduces 
stocking rates for animals; full pricing of agricultural inputs and charges for environmental 
damages, etc. (Mirovitskaya and Ascher). 
However, interpreting sustainability as “an approach” is not always useful for “guiding 
change in agriculture”. Firstly, strategies, which emerge in response to problems in developed 
countries, may be inappropriate in regions where circumstances and problems are quite   4
different (e.g. underdeveloped, developing or transitional countries). Secondly, it may lead to 
rejection of some approaches associated with conventional agriculture but nevertheless 
enhancing sustainability. Next, it make impossible to evaluate the contribution of a strategy to 
sustainability since that particular approach is already been used as a “criterion” for defining 
sustainability. Finally, because of limited knowledge during implementation of a strategy it is 
likely to make errors ignoring some that enhance sustainability or promoting others that 
threaten (long-term) sustainability. 
Another concept characterizes sustainability of agricultural system as  “ability to 
satisfy a diverse set of goals through time” (Hansen).  The goals generally include provision 
of adequate food (food security), economic viability, maintenance or enhancement of natural 
environment, some level of social welfare, etc.  However, usually there is “conflicts” between 
different qualitative goals and that creates problems of assessment  (integration, ranking, 
trade-offs). Besides, “subjectivity” of specification of goals link criteria for sustainability with 
value of pre-set goals (interests of stakeholders, priorities of development agencies, standards 
of analysts, etc.) rather than to the agricultural system itself. At last, at low levels of analysis 
(parcel, farms, sectors, regions) most of the objectives are exogenous and belong to a larger 
system. 
Number of authors interprets sustainability as an “ability (potential) of system to 
maintain or improve its functions” (Hansen; Mirovitskaya and Ascher). Accordingly, main 
system attributes that influence sustainability are specified as: resilience; survivability; 
profitability; productivity; quality of soil, water, and air; energy efficiency; wildlife habitat; 
quality of life; and social acceptance, etc. Indicators for measurement of these attributes are 
identified and their time trends evaluated. Since trends represent an aggregate response to 
several determinant that eliminate the needs to devise aggregation schemes.  Usefulness of 
that definition comes for suggesting operational criteria for sustainability, providing a basis 
for identifying constraints and evaluating various approaches to improvement of agrarian 
sustainability. The most common critics are that it is impossible to find a single measure for 
different attributes; assumption that future state of system can be approximated by the past 
trends; and ignorance of needs and goals of human actors within the system.  
Sustainability has to be a criterion for guiding changes in policies, farming and 
consumption practice, agents behavior, focusing of research and development priorities, etc. 
Therefore, definition of sustainability has to be based on “literal” meaning of sustainability – 
thus perceived as a system characteristics and “ability to continue through time” (Hansen). 
Besides, characterization has to be “system-oriented” while system is to be clearly specified, 
including its time and spatial boundaries, components, goals, and context in hierarchy. 
Moreover, the approach is to allow comparative analyses of different agricultural systems
1. 
Characterization of sustainability must be predictive since it deals with future changes rather 
than past and present. And finally, it should be diagnostic, and to focus intervention by 
identifying and prioritizing constraints, testing hypothesis, and permitting assessments in 
comprehensive way.   
                                                 
1 Certain authors, like Hansen, wrongly associate comparability with “continues (quantitative) rather 
than discrete property” of a system. In fact, there is no reason to believe that sustainability of an 
agricultural system could only increase or decrease. Discrete features (“sustainable”-“non-
sustainable”) are possible, and of importance for farm managers, interests groups, policy makers.      5
 
Economics of agricultural sustainability 
The problem of sustainability has been always an important part of the economic 
theory. Most often it is discussed in relation to (in)efficiency of using of common natural 
resources (“tragedy of commons”) (Hardin), and to “negative externalities” associated with 
some activities (Pigou). In recent years, it is increasingly associated with multi-functionality 
(joint production character) of agriculture (OECD). 
When common ownership and “open access” to natural resources exists, there is 
tendency for inefficient use (“overuse”) of resources. For example, there are certain natural 
limits for “sustainable” exploration of a meadow (for livestock farming) or a pond (for fishing 
or irrigation). Long-term efficiency (output) would decrease if number of grazing animals or 
caching fish increase beyond these norms of effective natural reproduction. In a one-person 
farm or private ownership, there will be no conflict between efficiency and sustainability 
(maximization of output over time). However, in a situation of multiple users and open 
access, there are strong individual interests for overusing common resources since private 
costs are not proportionate to private benefits. In that case, individuals get full output from 
increasing the number of animals (or fish catch) while bear a small portion of overall decrease 
in total yield as a result of over-exploitation. Consequently, constant overuse (non-
sustainability) and low long-term efficiency come out as a result of this form of organization 
of natural resources.   
Nonetheless,  “tragedy of commons” could be avoided by alternative institutional 
arrangement. For instance, introduction of public regulation on exploitation of natural 
resources, such as distribution (and enforcement) of quotas for farmers and fishermen, would 
keep sustainability. In another instances, the privatization of natural resources would be an 
effective solution since it would create strong private incentives for long-term preservation of 
resources.  In later case, a private agent (the owner) will contract and control an effective and 
sustainable use of limited natural resources. 
Another classical case of “market failure” for allocation and sustainable use of natural 
resource is caused by the negative externalities of certain activities. Since free-market prices 
do not always reflect the effect on third party’s welfare, they cannot govern effectively 
resource allocation and uses. For instance, price of livestock products do not comprise the 
costs of pollution of underground water by farm activity. Since private agents (farmers, 
consumers of farm products) do not pay the full price and costs associated with their activity, 
they are not interested in the most effective (and sustainable) use of natural resources. 
Maximization of social output and welfare cannot be achieved, and inefficient allocation and 
overuse of resources, and unsustainable development, comes out as a result. Thus efficiency 
and sustainability of some elements of the system (e.g. farms) are in conflict with efficiency 
and sustainability of other elements of the system (e.g. consumers) or system as a whole.  
Therefore, elimination of differences between “social” and “private”  prices 
(“internalization of externalities”) through taxes, norms, etc. is commonly suggested. Besides, 
various methods for “evaluation of environmental resources and costs” are developed and 
used in analysis of overall efficiency. At the same time, effectiveness of suggested methods is 
questioned because the role and services of natural resources is not always known, and entire 
“social” (present and future) value could be rarely properly evaluated. Besides, all monetary 
assessments and dollars calculations of most part of negative externalities (e.g. adverse 
“impact” on human health; “value” of lost biodiversity; “exhausting” of non-renewable 
resources, etc.) do not often make sense since they are simply not socially acceptable (no 
“trade-offs” possible).     6
Coase proved that problem of “social costs” does not exist in the world of zero 
transaction costs and well-defined private rights (Coase, 1960). Situation of maximum 
efficiency is always achieved independent of initial allocation of rights. If for instance, farmer 
has the “right to pollute”, the affected agents would pay him an appropriate “bribe” (equal to 
lost income) to stop the polluting activity. If the opposite is true and farmer does not have the 
“right to pollute”, then he would pay the appropriate bribe for other agents to let him certain 
pollution. In either case, the welfare of all agents is maximized and maximum efficiency 
reached (Pareto optimum) without need for any public intervention. However, when 
transaction costs are significant, then costless negotiation and exchange of rights is not 
possible. Therefore, the initial allocation of property rights between individuals is critical for 
overall efficiency and sustainability. Consequently, institutional structures for carrying out of 
agrarian activities become important factor, which eventually determine the outcome of the 
system (efficiency) and type of development (sustainability). 
“Jointness of production” is a fundamental characteristic of farming. The classical 
example is when a market-oriented farm produces “multiple products” such corn and hogs, 
and feed corn to the hogs. That is caused by opportunities for more productive use of 
resources (economy of scale and scope), but as well as risk reduction strategy (diversification, 
integration of critical transactions) of farm manager.  In modern farming there are also 
outputs, which are less desired – e.g. wastes.  And finally, farming outputs consists of a mix 
of both “private” and “public goods” such as food, rural amenities (hunting, landscape, etc), 
ecological and cultural services, habitat for wildlife, biodiversity etc. A great part of farms 
“non-commodity” outputs is “not-separable” from the major farming activities. Moreover, for 
these (public, quasi public) goods no markets exist or they function very poorly. Since these 
outputs are not “tradable” the farmers will have no incentives to produce them in a socially 
demanded scale. For effective execution of such “public” functions of farms and production 
of the appropriate amount of “positive externalities” by agriculture it is necessary to develop 
and apply other (non-market) modes for governance. 
Principal role of governance structures for character and pace of development is 
recognized and intensively studied (North, Williamson).  Specific institutional environment in 
which activity takes place eventually determine the level of economic performance and 
sustainability in different regions, countries or periods of history. Factors for emergence and 
evolution of various types of institutions are quite specific for each society, and require 
multidisciplinary analysis and explanation. In the long-run, institutions are endogenous 
parameters and “institutional development” is to be included in the model. On the other hand, 
in the specific institutional environment “sustainability” of the different market, private, 
collective etc. modes will depend on comparative efficiency (adaptability) of alternative 
governing arrangements.  However, high efficiency and sustainability of different governing 
forms does not always means high efficiency and sustainability of development
2.  
Today “multi-functionality” of agriculture is socially recognized, and sustainability is 
considered both as criteria and a goal (outcome) of development. It is also recognized that 
sustainability cannot be effectively achieved as a “side result” of totally decentralized actions 
(free market competition, collective initiatives). The sustainable development requires 
effective governing and enforcement mechanisms including a significant public involvement 
in market and private transacting.  Therefore, analysis of governing modes for agrarian 
sustainability becomes essential both for defining the efficiency (potential and limits) of 
                                                 
2 History of institutional development is full of examples of “failures” while organization 
modernization is usually a success story (North, Williamson).   7
market competition and private sector initiatives as well as for designing the most effective 
modes for Government interventions in agrarian sector.  
 
THE NEW FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING FARM SUSTAINABILITY 
Farm as a governing structure 
Sustainability of a farm characterizes its ability to maintain (continue) over time.  
Since no economic organization would exist in a long-term if it were not efficient (otherwise 
it would be replaced by more efficient arrangement), the problem of assessment of 
sustainability of farms is directly related to estimation of factors and level of farm efficiency.  
In the traditional (Neoclassical) framework, the farm is presented as a “production 
structure” and the analyses of efficiency are restricted to production costs (“optimization of 
technological factors according to marginal rule”). This approach fails to explain why (in any 
given country) for a long period of time there exist so many farms with different levels of 
“efficiency”. In Bulgaria for instance, level of profitability and productivity in cooperative 
farms has been 5 times lower than in private farms (Kaneva). Besides, there have been more 
than a million highly sustainable subsistent and non-profit making farms in the country. 
In addition to production costs, modern farming (like any other economic activity) is 
also associated with significant transaction costs. There are enormous costs for finding the 
best partners and prices, for negotiating conditions of exchange and for contract writing, for 
enforcing and disputing agreements, for protecting property rights, etc. Rational agrarian 
agents will seek, chose and/or develop the most effective (less expensive) mode for 
organization of their transactions that minimize their bounded rationality, and safeguard their 
investments and (absolute and contracted) rights from hazard of opportunism
3. In the long 
run, only effective governing structures that maximize benefits and minimize costs of 
transacting will tend to dominate (sustain) in agriculture (Bachev and Tsuji, 2001a).  
If transaction costs were zero, then it would not be of economic importance whether 
agricultural activity is carried out by one-person or family farms, cooperatives or agro-
corporations with different size, or by a single nationwide company. All information for the 
effective potential of transactions (for exploration of technological opportunities, satisfying 
demands, etc.) would be costlessly available, and individuals would costlessly trade 
(exchange) resources in their mutual benefit until exhausting possibilities for increasing 
productivity, maximizing consumption, and sustainable development
4.  
However, when transaction costs are high, they could block otherwise effective 
transactions, and restrict farm size far bellow the technologically optimal level. Very often the 
high costs for market trading (e.g. for finding credit; marketing of output) and/or internal 
governance (e.g. deficiency of low transacting cost labor) limit the farm size to miniature 
subsistent farming or family borders. In other instances, existing effective potential to 
economize on market transacting costs could cause a vast extension of farm size through 
backward, lateral or forward integration of transactions. For example, high costs for market 
and contract trading after 1990 has turned the subsistent farming into the most effective (or 
only possible) forms for organisation of available agrarian assets (farmland, livestock, etc.) of 
more than a million Bulgarians (Bachev and Tsuji, 2001b). On the other hand, enormous costs 
                                                 
3 Transacting costs have “behavioral origins” such as bounded rationality and tendency for 
opportunism of economic agents (Williamson). 
4 Currently there is a principle agreement (social contract) for global sustainable development.   8
of market trading have caused domination of integrated and interlinked modes of transacting, 
and concentration of commercial farming in few thousands large firms and cooperative farms.  
Thus in the world of positive transaction costs, farms and other agrarian organizations 
have a significant economic role to play. They are not only production but also major 
governing structures – forms for organization of transactions and for minimization of 
transacting costs. Therefore, sustainability of different farms cannot be correctly understood 
and estimated without analyzing their comparative production and governance potential.  
 
“Institutional aspect” of sustainability 
Institutions (“rules of the game”) determine individuals’ rights in society and the way 
these rights are enforced. Formal and informal institutions affect (structure) human behavior 
and eventually determine the type of social development (North).  
Institutional framework is a critical factor for farm and agrarian sustainability. For 
examples, cannabis farms are highly sustainable in one institutional environment and quite 
unsustainable in another type of environment. Level of sustainability of a farm is quite 
different depending on existence of public support programs; introduction of strict product 
quality, labor, animal welfare, and environmental standards; permitted legal modes for market 
and private transacting; efficiency of Laws and contract enforcement; tradition, etc.  
Moreover, operational goals of sustainable development and mechanisms of their 
achievements are institutionally determined. For instance, (socially) acceptable norms for use 
of labor (e.g. employment of children, safety standards, minimum wages), plant and livestock 
(e.g. animal welfare, preservation of biodiversity, usage of GM crops), and environmental 
resources (e.g. water use rights; permissions for pollution of air, water, and soils), all they 
could differ even between various regions of the same country
5. On the other hand, depending 
on prevailing development policy, the governance of the supply of food and non-food (such 
as clean nature, beautiful countryside, etc.) farm products could be left to free market, 
bilateral and multilateral private actions, or organized through hybrid or public modes.  
Level of individual and overall transaction costs is greatly determined by the 
institutional environment. For instance, if state of Law, trust, good will, and stability dominate 
in a society, then costs for protection and exchange of private rights would be insignificant. 
Alternatively, if private rights were not well defined, enforced, or restricted, that would limit 
intensification of transactions and optimization of farms. Indeed rights on certain resources 
are often not well defined (e.g. rights on quiet and clean air, uncontaminated water etc.) and 
that creates big difficulties in effective allocation of resources (e.g. unsolvable disputes 
between polluting farmers and neighborhood). Consequently, less sustainable structures are 
applied, and some transactions are not carried out at socially effective scale.  
Finally, if formal institutions “do not work”, individuals develop and use more 
effective informal (or even illegal) modes to govern their exchanges.  In most of East 
European countries, personal and interlinked private forms have been broadly used in 
conditions of high transitional market and institutional uncertainty (instability), and a 
significant share of overall economic activity is still governed by informal (gray and black) 
structures. 
                                                 
5 In Valonia for instance, environmental standards are much more restrictive than in other two regions 
of Belgium (Flandria and Brussels).    9
Therefore, assessments of sustainability of farms have to be always done in the 
specific institutional rather than in unrealistic (“normative”, desirable) context. For instance, 
in EU, USA, and Japan, the direct and indirect support for farming has been institutionalized 
for many years now. That is why it makes no sense to say that “strongly dependent from 
public subsidies farms have not been sustainable”. Nevertheless, the institutional aspect is 
commonly missing in most of the suggested systems for assessing agrarian sustainability. 
Accordingly, non-feasible (ideal) norms rather than real-life alternative arrangements are used 
as criteria for efficiency - e.g. model of farming in developed countries, assumption for 
perfectly defined and enforced property rights, effectively working governments, situation 
without any public intervention and support to market and private transactions, etc. That 
“nirvana approach” is to be abandoned, and an analysis of structure (and evolution) of real 
institutional environment for farm transacting included in the assessment of farm 
sustainability.  
 
Defining economic sustainability 
Generally, every farm related transaction could be governed through a great variety of 
alterative  forms. For instance, supply of environmental preservation service could be 
governed as: an own voluntary activity of a farmer; though individual or multilateral private 
contracts of the farmer with interested (affected) neighbors or other agents (food chains, 
NGOs); though interlinked contracts between the farmer and inputs supply or processing 
industry; though a cooperation with other farmers and interested agents (collective initiatives, 
code of behavior); though a (free) market or assisted by a private agent (NGO, certifying and 
controlling company) trade with special products (“origins”, “organic” and “reduced 
chemical” products); though a public contract specifying farmers obligations and 
compensation; though a public order (mandatory regulations, taxation, quotas, sanctions etc.). 
Furthermore, organization of such supply by a farmer could be done individually as a 
specialized or interlinked activities; in cooperation; or contacted to another agent (farmer, 
cooperative, firm). On the other hand, that supply could be governed as a non-for profit or 
profit-making activities of a specialized entity - pricing the access to natural reserves and 
products of special origins; interlinking with eco-tourism, education farming, etc.; contracting 
provision with consumers, public and donors agencies, etc. And finally a mix or hybrid 
form(s) could be applied. 
Different governance modes are alternative but not equal modes for organisation of 
transacting. They give individuals dissimilar opportunities to coordinate and control 
transactions, protect private investments from opportunistic expropriation, and profit from 
specialisation and exchange (Williamson). Free market (“price movement”) has big 
coordination and incentive advantages (“invisible hand”, “power of competition”), and 
provides “unlimited” opportunities to benefit from specialisation and exchange. However, 
market governance could be associated with high uncertainty, risk, and costs due to price 
instability, great possibility for facing opportunistic behaviour, “missing market” situation, 
etc. Special contract form (“private ordering”) permits better coordination, intensification, 
and safeguard of transactions. However, it may require large costs for specification of contract 
provisions, adjustments with constant changes in conditions of exchange, enforcement and 
disputing (trough an expensive court system) of negotiated terms, etc. Internal (ownership) 
organisation allows greater flexibility and control on transactions (direct coordination and 
adaptation, internal dispute resolution). However, extension of internal mode beyond family 
boundaries may command significant costs for development (initiation and design, formal   10
registration, restructuring) and current management (for collective decision making, control of 
opportunism of members of coalition, supervision and motivation of hired labor, etc.). 
Economic exchanges (transactions) let more profitable use of resources but also 
require additional costs. Farmers and other economic agents (resource owners, consumers) 
will tend to govern their relations though the most effective forms – that which maximise 
benefits and minimised their costs. Therefore, the most effective form and size of a farm will 
be determined through optimisation of total (production and transacting) costs, and trade-offs 
between gain in the productivity/benefits and gain in transacting costs. Hence farm will be 
efficient (sustainable) if it manages all transactions in the most economical for the owner(s) 
way  – that is the situation when there exist no transaction, which could be carried out with 
net benefit. If a farm does not govern transactions effectively, it will be unsustainable since it 
experiences high costs and difficulties using institutions (possibilities, restrictions) and 
carrying out transactions comparing to other feasible organisation. In that case, there will be 
strong incentives for exploring the existing potential (adapting to sustainable state) through 
reduction or enlargement of farm size, or via reorganisation or liquidation of the farm. Thus 
either alternative farm or non-farm application of resources; or farm expansion through 
employment of additional resources; or trade instead of internal use of owned land and labor; 
or taking over by (or merger with) another farm, will take place. 
Furthermore, transacting modes and acceptable net benefits will vary according to 
individual’s preferences, entrepreneurship ability, risk aversion, opportunity costs of owned 
resources, etc. Expected benefits could be: monetary or non-monetary income; profit; indirect 
revenue; pleasure of self-employment or family enterprise; enjoyment of agricultural 
activities; desire for involvement in environment, biodiversity, or cultural heritage 
preservation; increased leisure and free time, other non-economic benefits. For instance, it is 
widely known that “desire for preservation of farm for future generation” has been a major 
reason for persistence (sustainability) of a great number of part-time farms in Japan. 
In order to assess farm efficiency and sustainability we have to put individual 
transaction in the centre of analysis, and to assess level of associated costs and benefits. 
Major types of farm transactions are associated with know-how supply, innovation supply, 
land supply, labor supply, inputs supply, finance supply, insurance supply, and marketing of 
services and products. Therefore, an analysis is to be made on comparative efficiency of 
organisation of every major transaction of the farm. If significant costs (difficulties) of some 
type of transacting in relation to feasible alternatives is in place, then farm is to be considered 
as non-sustainable. Given the fact that an alternative form often diminish one type while 
increasing other kind of transacting costs, and widespread application of complex modes (e.g. 
interlinking credit supply with inputs supply and/or marketing), the overall (internal and 
external) transacting costs of the farm has to be taken into account.  
Next, farm’s potential (incentives, ability) for adaptation to the evolving environment 
through effective changes in governing forms (saving on transacting costs) and production 
structure (exploring technological possibilities for growth in productivity) is to be estimated. 
Thus if a farm does not have potential to stay at or adapt to new more sustainable level(s) it 
would be either liquidated or transformed into another type of farm. For instance, if a farm 
faces enormous difficulties meeting institutional opportunities and restrictions (e.g. new 
quality and environmental standards, production quotas); or it has serious problems supplying 
managerial capital (as it is in a one-person farm when an aged farmer does not have a 
successor), or supply of needed farmland (big demand for non-agricultural use of land), or 
funding activities (insufficient own finance, impossibility to sell equity or buy credit), or 
marketing output (changing demand for certain products, strong competition with imported   11
products), then it would not be sustainable despite the high historical or current efficiency. 
Currently there are numerous unsustainable farms in EU, which can hardly adjust to 
fundamental changes in CAP and associated new environmental, animal welfare etc. 
standards. Therefore, adaptability of farm characterizes to the greatest extend the farm 
sustainability, and thus has to be used as a main criteria and indicator for farm sustainability
6. 
 
Assessment of transacting costs 
Some transaction costs are well defined or could be easily specified – management, 
information, and marketing costs; fees for registrations, certificates, licenses; compensations 
for intermediaries; payments for lawyers and court suits; expenses for security; bribes, etc. 
However, a significant portion of costs of transacting is very difficult (expensive) or 
impossible to determine – costs for finding best partners, negotiations, controlling and 
enforcement of contractual terms, organizational development, interlinked transacting, 
unrealised and failed deals, future transactions, etc. Subsequently, assessments of overall farm 
efficiency could be merely based on traditional (accounting, statistical) data, and rarely done 
by precise calculation of transaction costs and comparison with production expenses
7.  
Defining the absolute level of transaction costs is not always possible but we could 
and actually need determine which governing mode (among practically possible alternatives) 
commands  relatively least costs of transacting. Since different governing modes (market, 
contract, internal organisation) differ in “discrete structural way”, the discrete structural 
(rather than “marginal”) analysis  is more suitable for evaluation of efficiency of the 
alternative organisational forms (Williamson). 
In the specific institutional environment, the most efficient forms for organization of a 
farm transaction will depend on the specific characteristics of each transaction (Williamson). 
Frequency, uncertainty, asset specificity, and appropriability have been identified as “critical 
dimensions” of transactions, and factors responsible for variation of transaction costs
8.  
When recurrence of transactions between same partners is high, then both (all) sides 
are interested in sustaining and minimizing costs of their relations (avoiding opportunism, 
building reputation, setting adjustment mechanisms, etc.). Besides, costs for development of a 
special private mode for facilitating bilateral (or multilateral) exchanges could be effectively 
recovered by frequent transacting.  
When uncertainty, which surrounds transactions increases, then costs for carrying out 
and secure transactions go up (costs for overcoming information deficiency, safeguarding 
against risk, etc.). While certain risks could be diminished by production management (stock 
keeping, reallocation, diversification) or a special market mode (e.g. purchase of insurance), 
the governing of most of transacting risk would require special private forms – trade with 
origins, giving guarantees, using share-rent or output-based compensation; providing 
economic hostages; participating in a risk-pooling, inputs-supply or marketing cooperative, 
internal organization.  
                                                 
6 Our suggestion to use adaptability as a criteria and indicator for sustainability has been already 
incorporated in the holistic System for assessing sustainability of agriculture systems in Belgium. 
7All these "measurement problems" make it also impossible to extend the Neoclassical models simply 
by adding a new "transacting" activity (Furuboth and Richter). 
8 First tree factors have been identified by Williamson while appropriability has been added by Bachev 
and Labonne.    12
Transaction costs gets very high when specific investments for relations with a 
particular partner
9 are to be made. Relation specific investments are "locked" in transactions 
with a particular buyer or seller, and cannot be recovered through "faceless" market trade (if 
transaction does not take place or it is terminated before the effective life-span of invested 
capital). Therefore, if a transaction requires significant highly specific assets, the farm has to 
safeguard dependant investment with a special form (such as long-term contract, interlinking, 
hostage taking, joint investment, ownership integration). Otherwise, specific investments 
would not be made, and transactions either take no place or occur without (or loss in) 
comparative advantages in respect to productivity (quality).  
Transacting is particularly difficult when appropriability of product or service is low. 
"Natural" low appropriability have most of the agrarian intellectual products (agro-market 
information, agro-meteorological forecasts, a big part of new agrarian technologies and 
varieties, software for agriculture, etc.). Besides, all products and activities with big positive 
or negative externalities are to be included in this group. Here costs and benefits are 
independent for individual participants. For such transactions possibility for unwanted 
(market or private) exchange is great, and costs for protection of private ownership, for 
detection of cheating, and for disputing rights - extremely high. Farmers would either over 
produce (negative externalities) or under organize such transaction (e.g. provision of 
environmental goods) unless they are governed by an efficient private or hybrid mode (trade 
secrets, cooperation, strategic alliances, long-term contract, or public order). For instance, 
since there is not an effective system for protection of rights on organics products in Bulgaria 
(independent certification and control; special marketing channels, etc.), farmers have no 
incentives to invest in organic production despite existing consumer demand and potential 
profitability. 
 
GOVERNING OF AGRARIAN AND FARM SUSTAINABILITY 
Principle governing matrix 
Following transaction costs minimizing logic we could determine the effective (most 
sustainable) forms for governing of farm related transactions. In the specific institutional 
environment, according to combination of specific characteristics of each transaction, there 
will be different the most effective and sustainable form for governing of farm transactions
10.  
Principle modes for effective (sustainable) organization of farm transactions are 
presented at Table 1
11. Transactions with high frequency, big uncertainty, great assets 
specificity (dependency), and high appropriability, have to be organized within the farm 
(ownership mode). For instance, managerial and technological knowledge is quite specific to 
a farm and its supply has to be always governed through a permanent labor contract and 
coupled with ownership rights. Long-term investments in land (orchard, vineyard, irrigation, 
building) are to be made on owned or long-leased rather than rented land (high site 
specificity). Dairy farm would never leases but owns cows, and all “critical” to farm material 
                                                 
9 Several forms of assets specificity have been identified - physical, human, site, dedicated assets, and 
brand name capital (Williamson). 
10 Operationalization of the Transaction cost minimizing concept is done namely by “aligning 
transactions (differing in their attributes) with governance structures (differing in their costs and 
competence) in discriminating (mainly transaction cost economizing) way” (Williamson). 
11 Table shows only the extreme levels (high-low) of critical factors of agrarian transacting. In the real 
agrarian economy there is a big variation of critical dimensions and thus of effective governing forms 
(including mixed, hybrid, interlinked etc. modes).   13
assets will be internally organized (production of forage for animals; important machineries; 
water supply for irrigated farming). Moreover, according to the level of farm specificity of 
assets, funding of investment projects will be effectively (possibly) done by quite different 
governance modes: while universal capital could be effectively financed by market (loan, 
bank credit) form, highly specific investments can be only made through internal (own 
funding, equity) funding (Williamson).  
 
Table 1. Sustainable (The Most Effective) Modes for Governing of Farm Transactions 













High Low High Low High Low High Low 
 
M  h  h         
SCF     h     h     
IO        h    h    
TPI       K      K   
P I            K 
* M – free market; SCF – special contract form; IO – internal organization; TPI – necessity 
for a third-party involvement; PI – necessity for public intervention  
Depending of the personality of resource owners and (transacting) costs of their 
coalition, different type of farm will be preferred - one-person farm (firm), family farm (firm), 
group farm or partnership (firm), cooperative farm, and corporative farms. Moreover, in the 
specific institutional environment (legal framework, support policies, tradition, level of 
transacting costs) various types of farm will have quite different effective horizontal and 
vertical boundaries. For instance, in transitional conditions of high market and institutional 
uncertainty, and inefficient property rights and contract enforcement system, most of agrarian 
investments happened to be in a regime of high specificity (dependency). As a result (over) 
integrated modes such as low productive subsistent household and group farming, or large 
production cooperatives and agro-companies, have been dominating in East European 
agriculture. Alternatively, in more matured economies, where markets are developed and 
institutions stable, agrarian assets are with more universal character. Therefore, farm borders 
are greatly determined by family borders, and more market and mixed (contract rather than 
entirely integrated) forms prevail. 
If specific capital cannot be effectively organized within the farm (economy of scale 
and/scope explored, funding made)
12, then an effective governing form outside farm-gates is 
to be used (group farming, joint ownership, cooperative, lobbying for public intervention). 
Very often transacting costs for initiation and maintaining of such “collective organization” is 
great because of the big number of coalition, different interests of member, opportunism of 
“free-riding” type (Olson). Consequently, that creates serious problems for efficiency 
                                                 
12 Integration of transactions would either increase management costs (needs to buy from or sell to 
competitor) or it would be loss-making comparing to outside production costs (price) competition.   14
(sustainability) of individual farms - missing markets, monopoly or quasi-monopoly situation, 
impossibility to “induce” public intervention, etc.  
Farm transactions with good appropriability, high certainty, and universal character of 
investments (partner can be changed anytime without significant additional costs) could be 
effectively carried across free market through spotlight or classical contracts. Here 
organization of transactions with a special form or within the farm would only bring extra 
costs without producing any transacting benefits.  
Recurrent transactions with low assets specificity, high uncertainty and 
appropriability, could be effectively governed through a special contract. Moreover, 
relational contract has been invented, when detailed terms of transacting are not known at 
outset (high uncertainty), and a framework (mutual expectations) rather than specification of 
obligations is practiced. Partners (self)restrict from opportunism and are strongly motivated to 
settle emerging difficulties (situation of frequent bilateral trade). Besides, no significant risk is 
involved since investments could be easily (costlessly) redeployed to another use or users (no 
assets dependency exist).  
A special contract forms is also efficient for rare transactions with low uncertainty, 
high specificity and appropriability. Dependent investment could be successfully safeguarded 
through contract provisions since it is easy to define and enforce relevant obligations of 
partners in all possible contingencies (no uncertainty surrounds transactions). Here the 
occasional character of transactions does not justify their internalization within the farm.   
However, serious transacting problems arise when condition of assets specificity is 
combined with high uncertainty, low frequency, and good appropriability of transactions. 
Given that elaboration of a special governing structure for private transacting is not justified, 
specific investments are not made, and transactions fail to occur at effective scale ("market 
failure", "contract failure"). Similar difficulties are also encountered for rare transacting 
associated with high uncertainty and appropriability. In these cases, a third part (private 
agent, Government, local authority) involvement in transactions is necessary (through 
assistance, arbitration, regulation) in order to make them more efficient or possible at all. For 
instance, when State establishes and enforces quality and safety standards for farm inputs 
(chemicals, machinery) and produces, or certify providers of agrarian services, or regulate 
employment relations, or guarantee minimum price for farmers, all that considerably 
facilitates and intensifies (market and private) transactions and increases farm sustainability.   
When appropriability associated with a transaction is low, there is no pure market 
mode to carry such transactions effectively. Transactions could be still governed by “good 
will” (private initiatives, voluntary actions), or through a private mode if high frequency (pay-
back of investment is possible) and mutual assets dependency (thus incentive to cooperate) 
exists. In these cases, trade secrets, interlinking, bilateral or collective agreements, close-
membership cooperatives, codes of professional behavior, alliances, internal organization, etc. 
are used. However, emerging of special large-members organizations for dealing with low 
appropriability would be very slow and expensive, and they unlikely be sustainable in a long 
run (“free riding” problem). Therefore, there is strong need for a third-party public 
(Government, local authority, NGO, international assistance) intervention in order to make 
such transaction possible or more effective.  
For example, supply of environmental goods by farmers could hardly be governed 
through private contracts with individual consumers because of the low appropriability, high 
uncertainty, and rare character of transacting (high costs for negotiating, contracting, charging 
all potential consumers, disputing). At the same time, supply of additional environmental 
protection and improvement service is very costly (in terms of production and organization   15
costs) and would unlikely be carried out by farmers on voluntary basis. Besides, financial 
compensation (price-premium) of farmers by willing consumers through a pure market mode 
is also ineffective (high information asymmetry, enforcement costs, etc.).  A third-party mode 
with a direct Government involvement would make that transaction effective: on behalf of the 
consumers the Government agency negotiates with farmers “contracts for environment 
conservation and improvement service”, coordinates activities of various agents (including 
direct production management), provides public payments for compensation of farmers, and 
controls implementation of negotiated terms. Namely, individual and voluntary public 
environmental contracts have been broadly used in EU
13 and in some other developed 
countries (USA, Switzerland, Japan) as an effective form to govern the supply of socially 
desirable level of environmental preservation and improvement services. In some countries 
(Canada, Australia, New Zealand) public support is more directed to collective (groups, 
community) initiatives and thus collective contracts are broadly employed. 
Alternatively, a public or independent system for certification, control, and marketing of 
special (organic, fair-trade) products could be organized, and sustainable governance of 
(environmentally friendly and socially just) agriculture carried out. Emergence and 
unprecedented development of the organic farming and system of fair-trade in last 15 years 
are good examples in that respect. In EU organic farming is one of the most dynamic sectors 
having an annual growth of 25% between 1993-98, and around 30% since then. On the other 
hand, world sales of fair-trade products has grown 3,2 folds since 1997 having an increase of 
42.3% just in 2002-2003.  
Effective modes for Government intervention 
There is a big variety of possible forms for public intervention in market and private 
transacting. The comparative advantages and costs of alternative modes for public 
involvements is to be assessed, and the most efficient one selected. Frequently that calculation 
is not made at all or it does not include all costs – e.g. direct tax payer contribution, 
transacting costs of bureaucracy  (coordination, stimulation, mismanagement, reorganization), 
costs for individuals’ participation and usage of public modes (for information, time and 
efforts spent, payments of fees and bribes, etc.). Consequently, there are plenty of examples 
for bad Governments interventions in agrarian sphere around the world.  
Low appropriability is often caused by unspecified or badly specified private rights. In 
some cases, the most effective government intervention would be to introduce and enforce 
new private property rights – e.g. rights on natural, biological, and environmental resources; 
tradable quotas for polluting; private rights on intellectual property, origins, etc.). In other 
instances, the most economical will be to put in place and enforce regulations for utilization 
of resources (water user rights) and reducing negative externalities – e.g. limits for comfort 
diminution (noise, odor); norms for contamination of water, soil, and air; rules for using GM 
crops; taxes for polluters. Often providing public information, education, or support 
(assistance in organization formation, public or quasi-public funding, tax relieve) to private, 
collective or community organizations would be the best solution.  
In some cases, pure public organization (in-house production, public provision) will 
be the most effective as in the case of agrarian research and education, agro-market 
information, agro-meteorological forecasts, etc. In other instances, hybrid modes (public-
private partnership) would be much more efficient than pure public forms given coordination, 
incentives, and control advantages. In majority of cases, involvement of farms and farms 
organizations in supply of non-food services such as preservation and improvement of 
                                                 
13 Currently agri-environmental programs cover about 20% of EU agricultural land.   16
biodiversity, and landscape, and historical and cultural heritages, etc. is the most economical 
form
14. That is determined by farmers information superiority, strong interlinks of activity 
with traditional food production (economy of scope), high assets specificity to the farm 
(farmers competence, high cite-specificity of investments to the farm and land), and spatial 
interdependency (need for cooperation of farmers at regional or wider scale), and not less 
important - farm’s origin of negative externalities (“polluter liability principle”). 
And finally, there are transactions, which are to be initiated or governed by 
international  (regional, European Union, worldwide) organizations  due to the strong 
necessity for trans-border cooperation or consistent (national, local) “government failures”.  
In any case, if there is strong need for a third-party public involvement but an effective 
government intervention is not introduced in a due time, development of farms and farm 
structures would be substantially deformed. In Bulgaria, there have been a great number of 
bad examples for Government under and over interventions in agrarian sector since the 
beginning of transition now (Bachev and Tsuji, 2001b). Consequently, primitive, 
uncompetitive or unsustainable small-scale farming; predominance of over-integrated and 
personalized rather than market exchanges; ineffective (large, non-productive, inflexible, non-
transparent, corrupted) agrarian bureaucracy; and blocking out of all class of agrarian 
transactions (e.g. innovation and extension supply, long-term finance supply, infrastructure 
development, supply of environmental goods), etc. all they have come out as a result. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In the traditional framework there is only one mechanism for governing of sustainable 
agrarian development. “Free market prices” (and market competition) effectively coordinate 
and stimulate entire activity of resource owners, entrepreneurs, and consumers. Accordingly 
all farms constantly “adapt” to price movements being equally efficient and sustainable. Rare 
cases of market disturbances (“failures”) are also recognized (“negative externalities”, 
“tragedy of commons”) but perfect “government intervention” is seen as a remedy.  All that 
leads to an interrupted global sustainable development. 
In the real market based agrarian economy, there are additional important factors 
affecting individual choice and farms sustainability (namely institutions and transacting 
costs), and a great variety of effective governing mechanisms. Institutional environment is a 
crucial factor, which eventually determine the “type” and level of sustainability of different 
agrarian structures (markets, different contractual arrangements and organizations). In the 
specific institutional setting, economic agents use or develop a great variety of effective (and 
thus highly sustainable) market and  non-market modes to govern their exchanges. 
Consequently, studying out the farm as a governance (rather than production) structure 
becomes a key for understanding the farm efficiency and sustainability. 
Agrarian agents tend (have) to govern available resources in the most economical way 
adapting to institutional environment and minimizing costs of their transacting. If some 
transactions are not managed through the most effective way, comparing to feasible 
alternatives, then farm will be unsustainable. In relation to individual agent’s preferences, 
experience, risk aversion, opportunity costs, and critical attributes of each transaction, there 
will be different effective structure for organization of available resources and exchanges 
                                                 
14 Environmental cooperatives have been very successful in some EU countries. In Holland for 
instance, there are 81 environmental cooperatives with 6600 farmer-members, which accounts 6% of 
all farms and 7% of the total farmland (Hagedorn).   17
(market trade, internal organization, cooperation, etc.). Accordingly, at any given period of 
time, farms of various type (subsistent, family, cooperative, corporative) and size could 
persist (sustain) in agriculture.  
In the suggested new approach, the analysis is focused on assessment of the 
comparative efficiency (potential to face institutional restrictions, for growth in productivity, 
and economizing on transaction costs) of a farm, and farms of different type, sub-sectors, 
regions, etc. Moreover, direct qualitative methods are combined with indirect or pure 
qualitative (discrete structural) approach for assessing sustainability level. All that requires 
collection and use of new type of micro-economic data for farm transactions, their critical 
dimensions, and specific institutional environment for agrarian and related activities. 
The new framework helps us better understand the factors for sustainable development 
and the “Government’s role” as well. Analyses of the transaction costs identify an immense 
range of “market failures” associated with unspecified or badly specified property rights; 
inefficient public contract enforcement system; high uncertainty and asset specificity, and low 
appropriability of transactions. Economic agents deal with market failures developing 
different (and highly sustainable) private forms for effective transacting. However, private 
sector (contract or internal modes) also “fails” to organize some transactions at effective 
scale. Thus there is a strong need for a third-party public involvement in market and private 
transactions aiming at facilitating and minimizing costs of exchange, reducing uncertainty and 
asset specificity, and increasing appropriability and frequency of transactions. Sustainable 
development is significantly compromised if both market and private sector fails, and no 
effective public intervention (property rights and institutional modernization, assistance, 
mediation, hybrid and public organization) takes place.  
Therefore, high current and historical efficiency does not mean high sustainability of 
farms. Moreover, big sustainability of farms does not always mean sustainable agrarian 
development. On the other hand, sustainable development does not exclude fundamental 
modernization of farms (enlargement, transformation into other types, etc.). Finally, different 
forms of public interventions are with unequal efficiency in respect to farms sustainability and 
sustainable agrarian development (“government failure” is possible). Our new approach not 
only opens different horizon for analyses of farm efficiency and sustainability but also have 
direct implications for improvement of public policies and agro-business strategy formation. 
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